SCO at a Glance
Founded: 1996 as the Shanghai Five; became the SCO in 2001
Headquarters: Beijing, China
Full Members (9): China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran (joined 2023), Belarus (joined 2024)
Dialogue Partners (14): Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Qatar, Nepal, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Maldives, Armenia, Azerbaijan
Observers: Afghanistan, Mongolia
Population Coverage: Over 3.4 billion people (about 40% of the world)
Geographic Reach: Across Eurasia, from the Pacific Ocean to Eastern Europe and the Middle East
Economic Share: Roughly 25% of global GDP
Core Goals: Regional security cooperation; Counterterrorism and extremism; Economic integration and connectivity; Alternative framework to Western-led institutions
Key Challenge:
Still searching for a clear identity as a bloc — caught between being a security forum, an economic platform, and a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
When the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) convenes this weekend in Tianjin, northern China, the gathering will be more than a diplomatic summit. For Beijing, it is a moment of theater, a chance to showcase its convening power at a time when Washington is burning bridges with allies and competitors alike. More than 20 foreign leaders and representatives of 10 international organizations are expected to attend, making this one of the largest SCO meetings in the bloc’s history.
Among the guests are leaders from every corner of Eurasia and beyond: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iran’s President Masoud Pezehkian, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and the Maldives’ Mohamed Muizzu. The summit will also host United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn.
The gathering comes at a moment of global turbulence. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on. Israel’s devastating war in Gaza and military operations across the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran have split world opinion. In South Asia and the Asia-Pacific, tensions are sharpening. And in Washington, President Donald Trump has launched a tariff offensive—slapping a 50 percent levy on Indian goods and threatening others—that has scrambled trade relationships across the globe. Against this backdrop, China wants to present itself as a stabilizing force and the SCO as a platform for the Global South to push back against Western dominance.
From the Shanghai Five to a Regional Bloc
The SCO’s origins trace back to 1996, when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five, a loose security framework aimed at settling post-Soviet border disputes. In 2001, with the addition of Uzbekistan, the grouping rebranded itself as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, establishing a headquarters in Beijing. Over the years, its membership steadily expanded: India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024. Today the SCO claims not only nine full members but also 14 dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.
With such a broad membership—stretching from the Pacific to the Middle East—the SCO represents an enormous slice of the world’s population and geography. Its combined reach dwarfs many Western organizations. Yet the bloc has always struggled with a clear identity. Is it primarily a security pact? A trade forum? A political counterweight to NATO and Western institutions? Two decades on, the answers remain elusive.
Indivisible Security vs. Collective Defense
One of the SCO’s central themes has been the concept of indivisible security: the idea that no country’s security should come at the expense of another’s. This is positioned as a direct alternative to NATO’s collective defense model, which is explicitly bloc-based. For Beijing and Moscow, indivisible security doubles as a demand that Washington respect their spheres of influence, especially in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.
Analysts caution, however, that this vision often runs up against reality. The SCO has failed to articulate a common approach on core global crises. On Ukraine, Russia has persuaded most members to avoid outright condemnation, but India maintains a balancing act—purchasing record amounts of Russian oil while preserving ties with Kyiv. Ukraine has urged the SCO to show respect for international law by condemning Moscow’s war, but that appeal will almost certainly be ignored.
The war in Gaza has exposed further fractures. When the bloc condemned Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year, India refused to endorse the statement, mindful of its own deepening partnership with Tel Aviv. Tensions between India and Pakistan, meanwhile, remain a persistent fault line. New Delhi has pushed the SCO to adopt stronger language on terrorism, accusing Islamabad of sponsoring cross-border violence. In July, when the group declined to condemn an attack in Kashmir that killed 26 people, India responded by blocking a joint defense communiqué.
A Showcase for Beijing
Despite its lack of unity, the summit’s optics carry weight. Hosting such a diverse array of leaders allows China to project influence at a time when Washington appears increasingly isolated. The timing is deliberate: just two days after the SCO meetings conclude, Beijing will host a grand military parade to commemorate the end of World War II in Asia. Leaders such as Putin, Lukashenko, and Subianto are expected to stay on for the spectacle. Even North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is rumored to attend, providing China with an additional moment to showcase its global reach.
For Xi Jinping, the dual events send a clear message: while Washington alienates partners with tariffs and unilateral policies, China remains open for business and diplomacy. The SCO stage offers Beijing a chance to frame itself as a builder of multilateralism in contrast to the United States’ perceived unilateralism.
Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities
The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.
BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.
This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.
Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities
The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.
BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.
This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.
Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities
The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.
BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.
This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.
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