The sudden coziness between Donald Trump and Pakistan — particularly with Army Chief Asim Munir — has startled many analysts. Islamabad has pitched itself as a hub for critical minerals and bitcoin mining. In April, a cryptocurrency venture backed by Trump signed a letter of intent with Pakistan’s crypto council during a visit by its co-founders. Pakistani officials have also promised to offer American businesses access to mining projects.
Whether these renewed ties yield lasting results is far from certain. Deals involving crypto or critical minerals would take years to bear fruit, and beyond counterterrorism cooperation, it is unclear what Pakistan can deliver in the short term. Trump’s pledge to tap Pakistan’s oil reserves has only fueled skepticism among experts, who question what reserves he is even referring to.
The U.S.-Pakistan equation is further complicated by Islamabad’s deep ties with Beijing. China remains Pakistan’s largest trading partner, and during Munir’s recent visit to Beijing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi called both nations “ironclad friends.” Their cooperation now extends firmly into the military sphere: Pakistan has bought Chinese aircraft, missiles, and just before Munir’s Washington trip, 10 new attack helicopters. These systems were used in Pakistan’s downing of at least one Indian fighter jet in May.
“The United States cannot match the investments China has made in Pakistan, nor the way it addresses our defense and economic needs,” noted one former Pakistani envoy. Historically, U.S.-Pakistan ties have been uneven at best.
Some analysts view the latest U.S. outreach as transactional. Modi invested heavily in its relationship, only to see it unravel. Why should Pakistan expect a different outcome?
Complicating matters further is the downturn in U.S.-India relations. Washington has grown frustrated with New Delhi’s continued energy purchases from Moscow and its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which risks sanctions under CAATSA. If the chill deepens, America’s long-standing role as a crisis manager in South Asia may erode. During the 1999 Kargil War, Washington leaned hard on Pakistan to back down. Today, Trump’s tilt toward Islamabad — including resumed military aid and IMF support — changes that calculus.
At the same time, India has hardened its military doctrine. Modi’s government has signaled that future retaliatory strikes will not be geographically limited to Kashmir, that nuclear threats from Pakistan will not deter operations, and that diplomacy will remain frozen until terrorism is addressed. Without Washington’s restraining hand, India may feel freer to act militarily, raising the risks of uncontrolled escalation.
The consequences extend beyond South Asia. Strained U.S.-India ties could disrupt arms sales, intelligence sharing, and even weaken the Quad partnership with Japan and Australia — a strategic setback that would hand China an advantage.
A diplomatic reset through a carefully staged Modi-Trump meeting could cool tensions, but core disagreements over Russia and Pakistan will linger. India, true to its multi-alignment strategy, will keep hedging: deepening ties with Europe, the U.K., and the Gulf states while balancing BRICS and SCO commitments.
For Pakistan, the challenge is to juggle its deep reliance on China with Trump’s overtures from Washington — a balancing act fraught with risk.
What is clear is that the “guardrails” that once kept India-Pakistan crises from spinning into full-scale war are crumbling. With hardened doctrines, fewer mediators, and great-power rivalry in play, the next crisis could be bloodier and less predictable than ever.
References:
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/next-india-pakistan-crisis-could-spiral-out-control
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