Indonesia in Flames: Protests, Anger, and a Nation on Edge

 

Indonesia has been rocked by a wave of riots and demonstrations that erupted with startling speed, catching both officials and citizens off guard. What began in early 2025 as simmering discontent over economic hardship and controversial parliamentary perks exploded on August 25, when protests in Jakarta spiraled into nationwide unrest.

The movement reached a breaking point on August 28, after Affan Kurniawan, a student protester, was killed when a Brimob police tactical vehicle plowed into demonstrators. The death ignited fury across the country, transforming grievances into a broad indictment of government accountability and police brutality.

Initially, protesters had demanded the reversal of parliament’s proposed subsidy schemes, punishment for lawmakers making insensitive remarks, and passage of a long-delayed Confiscation of Assets Act targeting corrupt officials. But after Affan’s death, student-led groups escalated demands to include sweeping reform of the Indonesian National Police, along with either recognition or dismissal of Police Chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo.

The unrest quickly spread beyond Jakarta. Demonstrators in Makassar, Surabaya, and other cities torched government buildings, looted officials’ residences, and clashed with security forces. The home of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati was ransacked, and several regional parliaments were set ablaze. On Friday evening, three people were killed when protesters torched a parliament building.

President Prabowo Subianto, facing the first major test of his presidency, canceled a planned trip to China for the SCO Summit and announced that parliamentary allowances would be scaled back. Both he and the police chief issued rare public apologies, with Prabowo calling the police crackdown “shocking and deeply disappointing.”

Yet the concessions did little to quell the anger. Muzammil Ihsan, leader of the All Indonesian Student Executive Body, dismissed the measures as inadequate: “The government must resolve deep-rooted problems. The anger on the streets is not without cause.”

Protesters are now pushing a wider agenda: higher wages, lower taxes, and tougher anti-corruption measures. For Prabowo, a former general long dogged by allegations of human rights abuses, the unrest has rekindled fears of a slide back toward authoritarianism.

Few expected the protests to swell with such force. “Nobody saw this coming. It happened very, very quickly, within a matter of days,” one observer remarked. But the streets of Indonesia now tell a different story—one of rage, distrust, and a demand for sweeping change.

Beneath the chaos lie deeper structural grievances: high unemployment, inflation, poverty, and entrenched corruption. Many Indonesians, particularly the youth, see few prospects in a fragile economy unable to generate jobs. Critics fear that without meaningful reform, the unrest risks eroding Indonesia’s democratic fabric and reviving memories of authoritarian rule.

As the crisis unfolds, Indonesia joins Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in a regional wave of instability driven by economic discontent. Whether Prabowo can calm the streets and steer the nation toward reform—or whether protests will spiral into prolonged unrest—remains the defining question for Southeast Asia’s largest democracy.

References: 

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_2025_Indonesian_protests
   

SCO Summit: India’s Reset with China

In Tianjin this week, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) became more than a regional summit—it became the stage for a carefully choreographed reset. For the first time in seven years, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to China, meeting President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the gathering. Their handshake was more than symbolic. It hinted at an opening: Xi declared that “China and India should be partners, not rivals,” while Modi spoke of a “new atmosphere of peace and stability.”

That reset comes at a time of global disruption. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has reignited trade wars, imposing tariffs on India for buying Russian oil. Russia remains under Western sanctions for its war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Washington’s once-celebrated relationship with New Delhi faces headwinds. As the U.S. burns bridges, India and China appear to be building one—albeit a fragile one.

From the Shanghai Five to Global Platform

The SCO began modestly in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five”—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—formed to settle border disputes in the post–Cold War vacuum. By 2001, Uzbekistan joined and the group formally became the SCO, headquartered in Beijing. Since then, it has steadily expanded: India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024. Today, the SCO represents nearly half the world’s population, stretching across Eurasia and increasingly positioning itself as a counterweight to Western institutions.

Yet the SCO still struggles with identity. Is it a security bloc? A trade forum? A platform for the Global South? Unlike NATO’s clear doctrine of collective defense, the SCO promotes the principle of “indivisible security”—the idea that no country’s security should come at the expense of another’s. It’s a thinly veiled rebuttal to U.S.-led alliances, signaling that Beijing and Moscow seek recognition as equal centers of power.

Fractures Beneath the Optics

The Tianjin summit gathered more than 20 foreign leaders and the heads of 10 international organizations. But behind the photo ops, divisions ran deep.

• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Moscow has pushed for SCO alignment with its interests, but India has taken a more balanced role—buying discounted Russian oil while still calling for peace and maintaining ties with Kyiv. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly urged SCO states to reject Russia’s aggression.

• Middle East Conflicts: The SCO condemned Israeli attacks on Iran this year, but India—mindful of its close ties to Israel—refused to endorse the statement. Gaza and the West Bank remain points of friction.

• India-Pakistan Rivalry: New Delhi pressed the group to condemn cross-border terrorism, particularly after a deadly April attack in Kashmir that killed 26. When consensus failed, India refused to sign the joint defense ministers’ statement.

• China’s Balancing Act: Xi sought to project China as a unifier of the Global South, yet the summit underscored how difficult it is for Beijing to forge consensus across such diverse interests.

Optics Over Outcomes

Analysts agree: the summit’s value lies more in symbolism than substance. At a moment when Washington appears to be dismantling the multilateral system it once built, Beijing is keen to showcase that it can host, convene, and lead. Russia, isolated by sanctions, finds in the SCO a platform for legitimacy. Central Asian states still prize the group as a security forum. For India, it’s a stage to counter terrorism and now—tentatively—reset ties with China.

The optics also carry global weight. With the Quad Summit looming later this year in New Delhi, Modi’s meeting with Xi will be closely watched in Washington. Trump has branded both BRICS and the SCO as “anti-American” and has threatened new tariffs on their members. But with U.S.-India relations frayed, New Delhi’s delicate diplomacy at Tianjin could signal a more multipolar future—where India plays all sides to preserve autonomy.

The Meaning of the Reset

For Xi, the summit was a chance to position China as a stabilizing force amid U.S. disruption. For Modi, it was a pragmatic recalibration: a recognition that in an era of tariffs, wars, and shifting alliances, India cannot afford permanent estrangement from its giant neighbor.

The SCO remains a bloc in search of identity. But for now, its greatest value may be precisely this: a stage where rival powers can at least perform cooperation—even as their deeper fractures remain unresolved.

References:

1. https://worldorderreview.blogspot.com/2025/08/the-sco-summit-2025-optics-power-plays.html
   
2. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyrwv0egzro
   
3. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/30/sco-summit-in-china-whos-attending-whats-at-stake-amid-trump-tariffs
   

World Aristocracies: Democracy in Retreat

 The V-Dem Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg, has released its 2025 annual report, offering one of the most comprehensive snapshots of democracy worldwide. Assessing 179 countries across seven principles—electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian—the report paints a sobering picture: democracy is shrinking, autocracy is spreading, and the balance of global governance is tilting.

Democracies in Decline, Autocracies on the Rise

One of the starkest findings: for the first time in years, autocracies now outnumber democracies. The world counts 91 autocracies (56 electoral and 35 closed) compared to just 88 democracies (29 liberal and 59 electoral). Countries like Belarus, Gabon, Lebanon, and Niger shifted from electoral autocracies into fully closed systems, cementing the trend.

This confirms what the report calls the “third wave of autocratization,” a steady erosion of democratic institutions with 45 countries sliding backward and only 19 moving toward democratization.

Liberal Democracy: An Endangered Species

Liberal democracies—the rarest form of governance—have fallen to their lowest levels since 2009, with just 29 countries holding that status. The numbers translate into demographics: fewer than 12% of people worldwide live under liberal democratic systems, the smallest proportion in half a century.

By contrast, 5.8 billion people—72% of humanity—now live under autocracy, whether electoral or closed. The remaining 17% live in electoral democracies such as Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria, but these are fragile and often contested.

The Grey Zones

Not all regimes fit neatly into boxes. The report highlights 17 “grey zone regimes”, caught between flawed democracy and soft authoritarianism. On the lower edge of democracy are Albania, Kenya, Mexico, and Nigeria; on the upper edge of autocracy are Benin, Guyana, Indonesia, Mauritius, and Mongolia. In these liminal cases, classification remains fluid and uncertain—underscoring the fragility of governance structures worldwide.

A World of Aristocracies

If democracy is retreating, what is advancing? The report suggests we are not seeing a return of 20th-century dictatorships but rather the spread of modern aristocracies of power—narrow elites consolidating control under electoral facades, constitutional tweaks, and manipulated institutions. The architecture of democracy remains in place in many states, but its spirit is hollowed out.

The result is a world less democratic than at any point in the past five decades—one where the language of elections and participation often masks the rise of entrenched, insulated ruling classes.

References:

1. https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/36317/autocracies-outnumber-democracies-for-the-first-time-in-20-years-v-dem/
   
2. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2024/region-reordered-autocracy-and-democracy
   
3. https://www.undp.org/future-development/signals-spotlight-2023/when-democracies-autocratise
   

The Missing Link in Pakistan’s Fiscal Order: Local Governments

 Why the NFC alone won’t fix a system rigged against citizens

On August 22, Pakistan’s president announced the formation of the 11th National Finance Commission (NFC), tasked with recommending how divisible revenues should be shared under the Constitution. Yet, as in past rounds, the debate risks being reduced to narrow formulas of federal–provincial transfers, while ignoring deeper flaws that make Pakistan’s fiscal system both centralized and disconnected from citizens’ needs.

At the core of the dysfunction is the absence of empowered local governments. Councils are frequently dissolved, elections delayed, and finances tightly controlled by provinces. With no real autonomous revenue streams, local governments remain dependent on ad hoc provincial grants, leaving them unable to deliver even basic services like water, sanitation, and infrastructure. The result is a state that struggles to win the trust of its citizens.

Comparative models highlight the gap. Mumbai, with 20 million residents, runs a $3.2 billion municipal budget, three-quarters of which comes from locally raised taxes and fees. Citizens pay because they see results. In contrast, Pakistan’s local governments deliver little, eroding the very social contract that underpins governance. Indonesia, too, offers a striking example: after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta devolved significant fiscal and administrative powers to 38 provinces and more than 500 districts and municipalities, sustaining governance in a nation of 285 million people.

Pakistan’s way forward demands comprehensive fiscal decentralization:

• Constitutional guarantees for the political and financial autonomy of local governments, including protection of elected tenures.

• Expansion of the tax base, with provinces taxing underutilized sectors such as real estate to reduce dependence on federal transfers.

• Federal reforms to cut bureaucratic waste and strengthen fiscal discipline.

A fiscal system is not simply about balancing books; it is about bringing governance closer to citizens and improving their daily lives. Without meaningful reforms—empowered local governments, a broader tax base, and strict fiscal discipline—Pakistan risks deepening regional disparities, economic stagnation, and the erosion of public trust.

The NFC alone cannot fix this. What Pakistan needs is not another formula—it needs a fiscal transformation.

References:

1. https://e.thenews.com.pk/detail?id=428985
   

World Disorder: In the Transition to a New World Order

The international order, as we once knew it, may be in its death throes. Yet the disorder filling its place is not the birth pangs of a new global system. What we see today is something starker: a semblance of order held together not by principles or institutions but by raw power. The old dictum that might makes right has returned, and no foreign policy doctrine appears sacrosanct anymore.

The United Nations, never more than a moral forum, at least once offered restraint. Even that fragile check is gone. What remains is a fractured landscape where great powers pursue their ambitions without apology and middle powers hedge to survive.

The Postwar Order and Its Western Foundations

The international order that shaped much of the 20th century was largely a Western creation, designed to maintain stability while securing the economic and strategic interests of the United States and its allies. Peace and financial stability were essential for capitalism to flourish, and America provided both: military power to guarantee security, and institutions like the IMF and World Bank to underwrite prosperity.

For developing countries, this system was a mixed blessing. Those with sound governance managed to benefit. Others, struggling under weak institutions or corruption, blamed their failures on colonial legacies and Western dominance. Yet despite grievances, the system offered a measure of predictability.

The end of the Cold War deepened globalization. The collapse of Soviet communism opened new markets, while China’s modernization, deregulation, and the information revolution accelerated integration. The liberalization of trade and capital flows produced unprecedented growth. The WTO facilitated a surge in foreign direct investment, and China became the emblem of a peaceful economic rise. For a time, peace, prosperity, and globalization reinforced one another.

9/11 and the Temptation of Unipolarity

America’s unipolar moment, however, carried temptations. The attacks of September 11, 2001, gave Washington the pretext to extend its dominance militarily. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, justified in the language of security and democracy, instead undermined norms of international conduct. The claim that aggression could be justified fractured the very principles of the postwar order.

Contrary to popular belief, these were not simply the wars of neoconservatives. They were driven by Cold War veterans like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, who saw in the post-Soviet vacuum a chance to entrench American influence in the Middle East and Central Asia before Russia and China could reemerge. Both wars failed. They eroded US legitimacy, drained resources, and exposed the limits of unilateralism.

Americans often say 9/11 changed the world. In truth, the world had already been changing. It was the United States that failed to notice. But the irony is undeniable: in trying to preserve order, Washington hastened its collapse.

Globalization’s Backlash

As the post-9/11 wars faltered, globalization itself came under fire. The rapid growth of a global elite, coupled with job losses in America’s industrial heartland, fueled resentment. China became the symbol of dislocation, the place where American factories and livelihoods had migrated. Populist politics surged, culminating in Donald Trump’s rise and the mantra of America First.

The rules-based order was redefined as an order designed by and for the West, to restrain China and others. The very idea of rules lost credibility. Rules became whatever suited the United States at any given moment. Institutions like the UN drifted into irrelevance.

Russia, NATO, and the Return of War in Europe

America’s effort to preempt a resurgent Russia by expanding NATO was another turning point. The prospect of Georgian and Ukrainian membership sharpened Moscow’s insecurities, providing a pretext for aggression. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed the fragility of Europe’s security order.

There is no such thing as justified aggression, but the normalization of invasions undercut the already weakened principle of sovereignty. The very laws written to prevent war have been trampled repeatedly, from Baghdad to Kyiv.

Regional Hegemons and Rising Aggressions

The weakening of the global order has emboldened regional powers. Washington’s rivalry with Beijing has encouraged others to leverage their positions for regional dominance. India, armed with Western backing as part of a China-containment strategy, has grown more assertive, whether in Kashmir, in water disputes with Pakistan, or in regional security rhetoric.

Nowhere, however, has the collapse of restraint been more evident than in the Middle East. The carnage in Syria under Bashar al-Assad, backed by Russia, shocked the conscience of the world. 

The UN’s Collapse

Meanwhile, the UN faces an existential crisis. Washington’s withdrawal of nearly a billion dollars in funding, combined with geopolitical gridlock, has rendered it powerless. It has failed to stop wars in Ukraine, Gaza, or South Asia. Instead, peace-making has become a freelance activity—sometimes mediated directly by Donald Trump, other times dictated by aggressors themselves.

Without functioning global institutions, middle and smaller powers are left adrift. Their survival increasingly depends on careful balancing—aligning with all great powers at once, while avoiding being captured by any. This, in the absence of a coherent system, is the closest thing to order available.

Disorder Without a New Order

What we are witnessing is not the slow birth of a new order but the spread of disorder. The old architecture—Western-led, rules-based, institution-heavy—has collapsed under the weight of wars, hypocrisy, and populist backlash. Yet no replacement has taken shape.

Multipolarity is often spoken of as the future, but in practice it has meant a patchwork of spheres of influence, with no shared principles to restrain violence or mediate disputes. The SCO, BRICS, and other alternative forums offer platforms for cooperation, but none possess the authority or cohesion to manage global crises.

The vanishing world order is thus less a transition than a void. Into that void have stepped great and regional powers pursuing narrow interests, while global institutions retreat into irrelevance. If history teaches anything, it is that such periods of disorder rarely last without cataclysm. The question is not whether a new order will emerge, but what catastrophe will force its birth.

References:

1. 
   

The SCO Summit 2025: Optics, Power Plays, and the Struggle for Identity

SCO at a Glance

Founded: 1996 as the Shanghai Five; became the SCO in 2001

Headquarters: Beijing, China

Full Members (9): China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran (joined 2023), Belarus (joined 2024)

Dialogue Partners (14): Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Qatar, Nepal, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Maldives, Armenia, Azerbaijan

Observers: Afghanistan, Mongolia

Population Coverage: Over 3.4 billion people (about 40% of the world)

Geographic Reach: Across Eurasia, from the Pacific Ocean to Eastern Europe and the Middle East

Economic Share: Roughly 25% of global GDP

Core Goals: Regional security cooperation; Counterterrorism and extremism; Economic integration and connectivity; Alternative framework to Western-led institutions

Key Challenge:
Still searching for a clear identity as a bloc — caught between being a security forum, an economic platform, and a geopolitical counterweight to the West.

When the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) convenes this weekend in Tianjin, northern China, the gathering will be more than a diplomatic summit. For Beijing, it is a moment of theater, a chance to showcase its convening power at a time when Washington is burning bridges with allies and competitors alike. More than 20 foreign leaders and representatives of 10 international organizations are expected to attend, making this one of the largest SCO meetings in the bloc’s history.

Among the guests are leaders from every corner of Eurasia and beyond: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iran’s President Masoud Pezehkian, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and the Maldives’ Mohamed Muizzu. The summit will also host United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn.

The gathering comes at a moment of global turbulence. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on. Israel’s devastating war in Gaza and military operations across the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran have split world opinion. In South Asia and the Asia-Pacific, tensions are sharpening. And in Washington, President Donald Trump has launched a tariff offensive—slapping a 50 percent levy on Indian goods and threatening others—that has scrambled trade relationships across the globe. Against this backdrop, China wants to present itself as a stabilizing force and the SCO as a platform for the Global South to push back against Western dominance.

From the Shanghai Five to a Regional Bloc

The SCO’s origins trace back to 1996, when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five, a loose security framework aimed at settling post-Soviet border disputes. In 2001, with the addition of Uzbekistan, the grouping rebranded itself as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, establishing a headquarters in Beijing. Over the years, its membership steadily expanded: India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024. Today the SCO claims not only nine full members but also 14 dialogue partners, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.

With such a broad membership—stretching from the Pacific to the Middle East—the SCO represents an enormous slice of the world’s population and geography. Its combined reach dwarfs many Western organizations. Yet the bloc has always struggled with a clear identity. Is it primarily a security pact? A trade forum? A political counterweight to NATO and Western institutions? Two decades on, the answers remain elusive.

Indivisible Security vs. Collective Defense

One of the SCO’s central themes has been the concept of indivisible security: the idea that no country’s security should come at the expense of another’s. This is positioned as a direct alternative to NATO’s collective defense model, which is explicitly bloc-based. For Beijing and Moscow, indivisible security doubles as a demand that Washington respect their spheres of influence, especially in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Analysts caution, however, that this vision often runs up against reality. The SCO has failed to articulate a common approach on core global crises. On Ukraine, Russia has persuaded most members to avoid outright condemnation, but India maintains a balancing act—purchasing record amounts of Russian oil while preserving ties with Kyiv. Ukraine has urged the SCO to show respect for international law by condemning Moscow’s war, but that appeal will almost certainly be ignored.

The war in Gaza has exposed further fractures. When the bloc condemned Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year, India refused to endorse the statement, mindful of its own deepening partnership with Tel Aviv. Tensions between India and Pakistan, meanwhile, remain a persistent fault line. New Delhi has pushed the SCO to adopt stronger language on terrorism, accusing Islamabad of sponsoring cross-border violence. In July, when the group declined to condemn an attack in Kashmir that killed 26 people, India responded by blocking a joint defense communiqué.

A Showcase for Beijing

Despite its lack of unity, the summit’s optics carry weight. Hosting such a diverse array of leaders allows China to project influence at a time when Washington appears increasingly isolated. The timing is deliberate: just two days after the SCO meetings conclude, Beijing will host a grand military parade to commemorate the end of World War II in Asia. Leaders such as Putin, Lukashenko, and Subianto are expected to stay on for the spectacle. Even North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is rumored to attend, providing China with an additional moment to showcase its global reach.

For Xi Jinping, the dual events send a clear message: while Washington alienates partners with tariffs and unilateral policies, China remains open for business and diplomacy. The SCO stage offers Beijing a chance to frame itself as a builder of multilateralism in contrast to the United States’ perceived unilateralism.

Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities

The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.

BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.

This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.

Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities

The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.

BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.

This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.

Multipolar Dreams, Fractured Realities

The SCO’s growth mirrors broader trends in global governance. After World War II, the United States spearheaded institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. But as emerging economies rose—China, India, Brazil, South Africa—alternative forums such as BRICS and the SCO gained traction.

BRICS has carved out a clearer role as a platform for the Global South, pushing for reforms in international finance and trade. The SCO, by contrast, remains more nebulous. Analysts describe it as a grouping still searching for identity—part security alliance, part economic forum, part political counterweight. Its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: diversity. Central Asian states look to the SCO for security guarantees and Chinese investment. India wants it to address terrorism. Russia seeks support for its geopolitical battles. And China sees it as a vehicle to challenge US dominance.

This diversity ensures that consensus is difficult, and ambitious goals often dissolve into vague declarations. Yet, as experts point out, symbolism itself has power. The very act of bringing together rivals like India and Pakistan, and critics of Washington ranging from Iran to Turkey, is a statement of multipolarity.

References:

1. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/30/sco-summit-in-china-whos-attending-whats-at-stake-amid-trump-tariffs
   

Global Flooding Crisis: A Rising Tide of Risk

From South Asia to Europe, climate change and human development are amplifying floods, displacing millions, and testing the world’s ability to adapt.

When Rains Turn Deadly

This year has been marked by devastating floods across the globe, from Central Asia, East and West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Europe—to the most recent deluges in India and Pakistan, where overflowing rivers and relentless monsoon rains submerged villages, displaced hundreds of thousands, and destroyed vital infrastructure. More than 430 people have died after torrential rains and “rain bombs” devastated mountain regions of India and Pakistan, swallowing entire villages.

The worst-hit was Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where officials reported over 370 deaths since Aug. 15, including 228 in Buner district alone, with dozens still missing. Videos showed streets turned into rivers, homes and cars swept away.

In Indian-administered Kashmir, at least 60 people were killed and more than 200 remain missing after floodwaters surged through Chashoti village.

The disaster echoes Pakistan’s 2022 floods, which left nearly 1,700 dead and caused $16 billion in damages, underscoring how climate change is amplifying extreme weather in South Asia. These disasters are no longer isolated events but part of a growing global pattern of water-driven catastrophe.

Gendered Toll of the Floods

In 2022, the UNFPA reported 650,000 pregnant women were affected by floods, many cut off from maternal care. The same pattern is unfolding in 2025, with thousands of expectant mothers again unable to reach clinics or midwives, heightening maternal and infant mortality risks.

Displacement deepens women’s vulnerabilities. Overcrowded camps lack privacy, sanitation, and safe food distribution, exposing women and girls to insecurity and indignity. Food scarcity compounds the crisis: with crops and livestock destroyed, women – typically household food managers – are left with nothing to provide. Limited mobility further traps rural women during flash floods, and globally, women are 14 times more likely than men to die in disasters.

A Perfect Storm of Human and Natural Forces

Floods are often portrayed as “natural disasters,” but increasingly they are man-made crises. Unchecked urbanization and poor planning have left cities vulnerable: concrete jungles prevent water absorption, while outdated stormwater systems buckle under intense rainfall. Dam failures and levee breaches can release walls of water with little warning. Meanwhile, climate change is intensifying the risk—warming the planet, raising sea levels, and fueling more extreme rainfall events.

Physics tells the story: for every 1°F increase in global temperature, the atmosphere can hold 4% more water vapor. With average surface temperatures today more than 2°F warmer than a century ago, there is nearly 9% more moisture in the air. This translates into heavier downpours and more destructive floods.

From Heatwaves to Deluge

Ironically, droughts and heatwaves can also worsen floods. Dry, hardened soils absorb less rain, causing water to run off quickly and pool in low-lying areas. Research shows that in the future, hot–wet conditions will dominate, with heatwaves followed by torrential rainstorms, amplifying flood risks.

Human Habits, Costly Consequences

Modern development has stripped landscapes of their natural defenses. Forests, wetlands, and floodplains that once absorbed rainwater have been replaced with roads, sidewalks, buildings, and farmland. Instead of seeping into the ground, stormwater rushes across hardened surfaces and into undersized drains, overwhelming cities. Compounding the problem, housing developments continue to rise in floodplains and coastal zones where flooding is inevitable.

A Rising Tide of Risk

According to NASA research, the share of people worldwide living in flood-prone areas has risen by 20–24% since 2000—ten times greater than earlier models predicted. In the U.S., First Street Foundation warns of sharply rising flood risk across the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, as well as in the Pacific Northwest.

Globally, floods kill thousands of people every year and displace millions. In 2024 alone, over 19 million people were forced to leave their homes due to fast-rising waters. The indirect toll can be worse than the flood itself: contaminated water spreads disease, crops fail, and livelihoods vanish.

Unequal Protection

The impact of floods depends on where you live. A farmer in Somalia may get no warning before flash floods sweep away their home, while residents in Florida may receive evacuation alerts but lack insurance to rebuild afterward. Meanwhile, the Netherlands—long a model of flood defense—has invested in tidal parks and sponge cities, where green infrastructure absorbs excess rainwater.

The Cost of Catastrophe

Flood damage is staggering. In 2023, flash floods in Slovenia caused an estimated €10 billion in damage—16% of the nation’s GDP. In the U.S., flooding accounts for nearly half a trillion dollars in asset losses annually. In Europe, extreme weather has cost more than €40 billion each year since 2021.

South Asia offers a stark reminder: this summer, Pakistan’s Indus River basin and northern India were swamped by monsoon floods, killing hundreds and displacing millions. Fields were destroyed, bridges collapsed, and recovery efforts strained already fragile economies. These floods echo the catastrophic 2022 inundation of Pakistan, when one-third of the country was underwater.

Preparing for a Wetter Future

Advances in early warning systems have saved countless lives by giving communities time to evacuate, particularly in middle-income nations. But the poorest regions remain at high risk, with little infrastructure to withstand deluges.

Solutions exist: building dykes and retention basins, restoring wetlands, expanding urban green spaces, and reinforcing coastal defenses. Yet scientists caution that adaptation has limits. As seas rise and rains intensify, some regions may face “managed retreat”—abandoning vulnerable areas altogether.

A Global Reckoning

Floods are as old as humanity, but their modern scale is unprecedented. Fueled by climate change and reckless development, they are reshaping where and how people live. With India and Pakistan’s latest floods fresh in memory, the world faces a stark choice: invest in resilience and adaptation now, or be swept away by the rising waters of tomorrow.

Reference:

1. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/jul/08/explainer-flood-risk-rising-around-the-world-what-can-we-do-to-adapt
   
2. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/cloudbursts-killed-400-people-south-asia-are-rcna225997
   
3. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1339822-gendered-toll-of-floods
   

Pakistan’s Ballot and the Barracks: The Military, Democracy, and America

 Pakistan’s 2024 elections were supposed to mark a step forward for the country’s fragile democracy. Instead, they became a familiar exercise in managed politics. Originally delayed, the polls were finally held on February 8, 2024, under a cloud of allegations: a sweeping pre-poll crackdown on the country’s most popular party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI); mass arrests of senior leaders and thousands of workers; and the extraordinary step of removing the PTI’s name and election symbol from the ballot.

Election day itself was marred by internet and mobile service shutdowns. Voters still turned out in significant numbers, but unexplained delays in tabulating results and discrepancies in vote counts deepened suspicions of manipulation. Behind it all lay the familiar hand of Pakistan’s powerful military, propping up the parties it favors and sidelining those it does not.

What was striking this time was not just the brazenness of the interference, but also the muted reaction from Washington. The Biden administration remained conspicuously silent in the weeks before the polls, even as signs of manipulation mounted. The day after the vote, the State Department offered a cautious acknowledgment of “concerns about allegations of fraud,” urging that claims of interference be investigated. Members of Congress, however, took a stronger stance. Thirty-one lawmakers signed a letter in late February urging the administration to withhold recognition of the new government until credible investigations determined whether the election had been rigged.

This divergence is telling. For decades, U.S. administrations have declared democracy to be central to their foreign policy. Yet when it comes to Pakistan, Washington’s silence reflects something deeper than disinterest — it reflects the true nature of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship. 

The Military: Washington’s Partner of Choice

Since the Cold War, America’s closest ties in Pakistan have not been with its civilian governments but with its military. From General Ayub Khan in the 1960s, who offered U.S. bases near Peshawar for surveillance of the Soviet Union, to General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s during the Afghan jihad, and General Pervez Musharraf in the 2000s as the “war on terror” ally, the pattern has been clear: the Pentagon and Pakistan’s generals speak the same language.

At critical moments, the Soviet-Afghan war, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the subsequent counter-terrorism partnership worth $23 billion in security aid — the Pakistani military was Washington’s go-to institution. American officials have long justified this reliance by citing Pakistan’s fragility and the fear that its nuclear arsenal could fall into the wrong hands. The army, for its part, presents itself as the country’s only competent institution, a narrative U.S. policymakers have largely internalized.

But this dependence has been costly. The military’s pursuit of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan — offering sanctuary to the Taliban even as it took U.S. counter-terrorism aid — undermined both America’s war and Pakistan’s own security. Today, the Pakistani Taliban have re-emerged as a lethal threat, launching attacks from Afghan sanctuaries against Pakistan itself.

Silence on Democracy, Noise on Security

Even as Washington has criticized Pakistan’s double game in Afghanistan, the military remains its indispensable partner. Civilian governments come and go — often weak, corrupt, or unstable — but the generals endure, ensuring continuity in U.S.–Pakistan relations.

That dynamic remains unchanged. While civilian leaders in Islamabad struggle for relevance, Pakistan’s army chief has been building a direct channel with Washington:

• December 2023 – The army chief’s first official U.S. visit included meetings with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Deputy NSA Jonathan Finer, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Charles Q. Brown. Counterterrorism and regional security dominated the agenda. His visit was treated as business as usual. He returned to the U.S. twice more in 2025, reinforcing the message: regardless of Pakistan’s political turmoil, the military remains America’s main interlocutor.

• June 2025 – A landmark five-day trip, including a White House luncheon with Donald Trump, unprecedented for a serving Pakistan Army chief. Talks covered trade, energy, artificial intelligence, and defense. He also engaged CENTCOM leadership and U.S. military officials.

• August 2025 – The army chief returned for a second visit within weeks, attending the CENTCOM commander’s retirement ceremony in Tampa, meeting U.S. military brass, and addressing the Pakistani diaspora, calling his engagements a “new dimension in Pak-U.S. ties.”

Such warmth helps explain Washington’s reticence over Pakistan’s deeply flawed elections. America still calculates that its interests — counterterrorism, regional stability, and nuclear security — are best safeguarded by a cooperative Pakistan Army, not by messy civilian politics.

Against that backdrop, the Biden administration’s soft touch on Pakistan’s flawed 2024 election seemed less surprising. Washington was far more vocal after the 2018 election, when the playing field was tilted against Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N — but at least all parties were allowed to contest under their symbols. By contrast, in 2024, PTI was effectively erased from the ballot, yet the U.S. response was notably restrained. 

A Missed Opportunity

For the sake of Pakistan’s democracy — and America’s credibility — Washington must do better. By deferring to Pakistan’s Election Commission or judiciary, institutions widely seen as complicit in the military’s designs, the U.S. risks legitimizing authoritarian engineering. A firmer American stance could begin to change the military’s calculations, since it derives international legitimacy from U.S. recognition and support.

In 2024, Pakistani voters demonstrated their faith in democracy by turning out in large numbers despite repression and intimidation. But they were once again forced to play within boundaries drawn by the military establishment. By staying largely silent, the Biden administration missed an opportunity to stand with them.

It should not make the same mistake again.

References: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-democracy-its-military-and-america/

US Tariffs on Indian Goods: Trade at a Crossroads

 US tariffs of 25% on Indian goods went into force earlier this month, but President Trump has since announced plans to double the rate, citing New Delhi’s purchase of Russian oil—purchases the White House argues are indirectly funding Russia’s war against Ukraine.

According to the US Trade Representative, Indian exports to the US in 2024 totaled $87.3 billion. Roughly 30% of those exports—about $27.6 billion worth of pharmaceuticals, electronics, raw drug materials, and refined fuels—remain duty-free. Hopes for a trade deal capping tariffs at 15% were dashed after India refused to open its agriculture market to American farm goods, citing fears of devastating the country’s small farmers.

Industries Under Pressure

The impact on Indian industries has been severe. Tiruppur’s garment factories, suppliers to major US retailers such as Target, GAP, and Zara, are reeling. In Mumbai, jewelry exporters face uncertainty, while Surat—the world’s diamond cutting and polishing capital—has been badly hit. Many factories that once sustained nearly five million livelihoods are now operating only 15 days a month.

Millions of workers depend directly or indirectly on these export industries. In Tiruppur alone, more than 600,000 workers are employed in garment manufacturing. In Surat, entire neighborhoods survive on diamond polishing wages. Along India’s coastal belt, shrimp farming supports vast networks of small-scale farmers and laborers. Now, all of these livelihoods are under threat.

Government and Policy Response

The Indian government has suspended import duties on raw materials for key industries, hoping to reduce input costs. It has also accelerated trade negotiations with the UK and Australia to open new markets for Indian goods. Yet these efforts are unlikely to deliver immediate relief.

For Indian policymakers, this is a sobering reminder of how quickly trade can become entangled with geopolitics. The tariffs are not just an economic tool; they are a diplomatic signal.

A Watershed Moment

Generations of Indian workers have been trained for global supply chains that now threaten to bypass the country altogether. “We built our lives on American orders,” one Tiruppur factory owner says. “If those vanish, what will we have left?”

India’s export sectors are facing a watershed moment. The tariffs have exposed long-ignored vulnerabilities: overdependence on a few markets, weak labor protections, and the absence of a robust domestic safety net. Whether India can turn this crisis into an opportunity—by diversifying markets, strengthening trade partnerships, and investing in its workforce—remains to be seen.

For now, Tiruppur’s silent factories, Surat’s half-empty workshops, and the uncertain waters of India’s shrimp farms are stark reminders of what is at stake.

Lessons for India

In the words circulating among Indian business leaders: “Increase self-reliance, diversify, and leave no stone unturned.”

US trade coercion has brought Indian exports to their knees—something New Delhi did not anticipate. India had long believed that Washington depended heavily on it as part of its strategy to constrain China. Policymakers played that card skillfully: Russia remained an all-weather friend while the US was a major trade partner, with more than $87.3 billion in annual commerce.

Now, however, India must absorb the lessons of this moment. The ball is in New Delhi’s court: will it seize the opportunity to reset its trade strategy, or risk being trapped in a crisis of its own making?

References:

1. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/27/trump-tariff-india-russian-oil-purchase
   
2. https://worldorderreview.blogspot.com/2025/08/effect-of-50-us-tariffs-on-india.html
   

Polio Resurgence in Pakistan: Two New Cases Reported in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa

 Pakistan’s battle against polio has suffered another setback with the confirmation of two fresh cases in the southern districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P). According to official sources, the new detections involve a 16-month-old girl from Union Council Mullazai in Tank and a two-year-old girl from Union Council Miran Shah-3 in North Waziristan.

With these latest infections, K-P now accounts for 15 of the 23 polio cases confirmed nationwide in 2025. Sindh has reported six cases, while Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan have recorded one case each. The data, released by the Regional Reference Laboratory for Polio Eradication at the National Institute of Health (NIH), underscores the enduring challenges of eradicating the disease in Pakistan.

Polio remains a highly infectious and incurable virus, often causing lifelong paralysis. The only effective safeguard is repeated administration of the Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) for every child under five, alongside timely completion of routine immunizations. Yet, the persistence of the virus reflects gaps in vaccination coverage, especially in areas where mistrust, misinformation, and logistical barriers hamper public health campaigns.

Globally, only Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to record endemic transmission of wild poliovirus. As of 2025, Pakistan has reported 18 cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1), compared with two in Afghanistan. Environmental surveillance further paints a troubling picture, with 348 WPV1-positive sewage samples identified in Pakistan and 41 in Afghanistan, indicating ongoing community transmission.

The resurgence highlights the need for sustained immunization efforts, stronger surveillance, and targeted interventions to address vaccine hesitancy. Despite years of progress, the latest numbers signal that eradication remains elusive.

For Pakistan, the renewed rise in polio cases is more than a health crisis—it is a call for urgent, coordinated action to protect future generations from a disease that the world has come so close to eliminating.

References:

1. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2563360/polio-cases-rise-to-23-as-two-more-detected-in-k-p
2. https://worldorderreview.blogspot.com/2025/08/pakistan-polio-crisis-cases-reach-21-in.html
   

Effect of 50% US Tariffs on India

 A Town on Pause

In Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu, the usually humming factories are eerily quiet. Known as the “knitwear capital of India,” this industrial town supplies ready-made garments to some of the world’s largest retailers: Target, Walmart, GAP, and Zara. But today, production lines are idle, warehouses are overflowing, and anxious workers mill about with little to do.

The reason is clear. The United States, one of India’s largest export markets, has slapped tariffs of up to 50 percent on Indian goods. For an industry where margins are already thin, the move has been devastating. A shirt that once retailed in the U.S. for $10 would now cost $16.40 with the tariff. By comparison, the same product from China sells for $14.20, from Bangladesh at $13.20, and from Vietnam at just $12. Even if duties were cut to 15 percent, India would still struggle to compete with its Asian peers.

For Tiruppur’s garment manufacturers—who collectively account for a third of India’s $16 billion in ready-to-wear apparel exports—the tariffs are a crushing blow. September usually marks the peak of the production season as U.S. orders ramp up for holiday sales. Instead, factories now face a chilling scenario: clients have paused all orders, and millions of dollars’ worth of finished garments sit piled in warehouses with no takers.

The Ripple Effect Across Industries

The pain is not limited to textiles. India’s export basket to the U.S. is diverse, ranging from garments and jewelry to shrimp and gems, and each of these industries is facing unprecedented disruption.

In Mumbai, jewelry exporters are bracing for impact. Each autumn, Indian firms ship $3–4 billion worth of gold and diamond jewelry to the U.S., timed with America’s holiday shopping season. This year, brands fear that tariffs will make their products prohibitively expensive, wiping out demand during their most crucial sales window.

In Surat, Gujarat—the world’s diamond cutting and polishing capital—the crisis is even more acute. Long before the tariff shock, the industry was already grappling with falling global demand and rising competition from lab-grown diamonds. Now, many factories that once sustained nearly five million livelihoods are operating only 15 days a month. Monthly polished diamond output has plunged from 2,000 stones to barely 300. Hundreds of contract workers have been sent on indefinite leave, and permanent staff face wage cuts or layoffs. “We used to work overtime during the festival season,” says one worker. “Now, we are lucky to get half a month’s work.”

The shrimp industry, too, has been left floundering. India is one of the world’s largest shrimp exporters, with the U.S. as its biggest market. But cumulative duties of more than 60 percent have turned a thriving business into a losing proposition. Prices have dropped by $0.60–0.70 per kilo since the tariffs were announced, and are expected to fall further once the full 50 percent rate comes into effect. Hatcheries that once produced 100 million shrimp larvae annually are now cutting output to 60–70 million. Farmers are left with little choice but to consider abandoning shrimp cultivation altogether.

A Blow to Livelihoods

For a country already struggling with slow job creation, the timing of this shock could not be worse. Millions of workers depend directly or indirectly on export-driven industries. In Tiruppur alone, over 600,000 workers are employed in garment factories. In Surat, entire neighborhoods survive on diamond polishing wages. Along India’s coastal belt, shrimp farming sustains vast networks of small-scale farmers and laborers.

Now, all of these livelihoods are under threat. Workers face decreasing wages, forced leave, or outright job losses. Many factories are cutting costs by slashing overtime pay and reducing shifts. The broader economic picture is just as worrying: falling exports mean reduced foreign exchange earnings and slower industrial growth, feeding into India’s already pressing employment crisis.

The Government’s Response

New Delhi has scrambled to cushion the blow. The government has suspended import duties on raw materials for key industries, hoping to reduce input costs. Trade negotiations with the UK and Australia have gathered momentum, opening up new markets for Indian goods. Yet these efforts are unlikely to provide immediate relief. Building a presence in new markets takes years, and exporters warn that hard-earned gains in the U.S.—won through decades of relationship-building—could be undone in months.

The geopolitical context further complicates matters. The latest round of India-U.S. trade talks, scheduled to take place in Delhi, was abruptly called off. American officials have accused India of “cozying up” to Beijing and acting as a laundering channel for Russian oil and goods. Washington’s stance reflects not only trade concerns but also larger strategic calculations involving China and Russia.

For Indian policymakers, this is a sobering reminder of how quickly trade can become entangled with geopolitics. The tariffs are not just an economic weapon; they are a diplomatic signal.

Searching for a Path Forward

The future of India-U.S. trade now hinges heavily on the Trump administration’s shifting priorities—domestic as well as foreign. In the meantime, India’s export industries are left with few options but to adapt. The new mantra, as policymakers and business leaders acknowledge, must be self-reliance and diversification.

For Tiruppur’s garment makers, that means pivoting to the domestic market, though it is far smaller and less lucrative than the U.S. For Surat’s diamond workers, it means hoping that new markets in the Middle East and Asia will absorb some of the slack. For shrimp farmers, survival may depend on switching to alternative aquaculture products.

Yet the transition will not be easy. Generations of workers have been trained for global supply chains that now threaten to bypass India altogether. “We built our lives on American orders,” one Tiruppur factory owner says. “If those vanish, what will we have left?”

The Stakes Ahead

India’s export sectors are facing a watershed moment. The tariffs have exposed vulnerabilities that were long ignored: overdependence on a few markets, weak labor protections, and the absence of a robust domestic safety net. Whether India can turn this crisis into an opportunity—by diversifying markets, strengthening trade partnerships, and investing in its workforce—remains to be seen.

For now, though, Tiruppur’s silent factories, Surat’s half-empty workshops, and the uncertain waters of India’s shrimp farms are stark reminders of what is at stake.

In the words circulating among Indian business leaders: “Increase self-reliance, diversify, and leave no stone unturned.”

References:

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98lr56mznjo

Forgotten Gratitude: Pakistan’s Unfinished Reckoning with 1971

 The people of Bengal were not just participants in the Pakistan Movement—they were its lifeblood. They played a decisive role in the rise of the Muslim League and, ultimately, in the creation of Pakistan. Yet, once the dream was realized, gratitude turned to betrayal. The very people who had helped establish the country found themselves systematically sidelined by a West Pakistani leadership that monopolized power, resources, and national identity.

Bengalis contributed the lion’s share of Pakistan’s exports but received a fraction of investment and aid. Their culture, language, and political aspirations were not simply ignored; they were actively suppressed. Power remained entrenched in West Pakistan, while East Pakistan’s demands for dignity and autonomy were treated as subversion.

When East Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly in the 1970 elections for a party of their own, West Pakistan’s response was not compromise, it was carnage. The ballots were answered with bullets. On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan Army launched a brutal crackdown on unarmed civilians in Dhaka. What followed over nine horrific months was not just repression—it was a campaign of genocide. Hundreds of thousands were killed, women were subjected to systematic sexual violence, and an entire population endured atrocities designed to crush their will. These were not accidents of war but deliberate acts of annihilation.

Yet, more than fifty years later, Pakistan still refuses to confront this truth. The genocide remains buried beneath denial, distortion, and evasion. Pakistani school textbooks deflect blame, attributing the break-up of the country to “Hindu teachers” and “foreign conspiracies.”

This refusal to reckon with history continues to haunt Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh. On August 24, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar claimed the 1971 issue had been “addressed,” when in fact it has not. Neither the 1974 tripartite agreement nor subsequent statements from Pakistani leaders amount to an apology or acknowledgment of genocide. As former Bangladeshi diplomat Touhid Hossain has pointed out, the wounds remain open.

Dhaka has repeatedly called for recognition of the genocide, repatriation of stranded Pakistanis, and settlement of pre-1971 assets. Each time, its appeals have been met with silence. Political ties have grown increasingly cold—nearly frozen—over the 15 years of Sheikh Hasina’s rule. A rare meeting between foreign secretaries this April again raised these long-standing demands, yet Islamabad offered no movement.

Still, the question looms: should the past forever dictate the future? Both nations stand to benefit from trade, cultural exchange, and regional cooperation. Improved relations should not be mistaken by India as a geopolitical shift toward Pakistan but rather as a long-overdue recognition that South Asia’s prosperity depends on breaking free from hostility. The paralysis of SAARC, stalled by Indo-Pakistani antagonism, has already deprived millions of opportunities for growth.

But reconciliation cannot come from evasion. History offers lessons. The Netherlands apologized in 2022 for its colonial violence in Indonesia. Japan, in 2016, formally acknowledged and compensated Korean “comfort women.” Jacques Chirac, in 1995, admitted France’s role in deporting Jews during World War II. The U.S. apologized in 1988 for the internment of Japanese Americans. Germany’s Chancellor Willy Brandt famously fell to his knees in Warsaw in 1970—a gesture that spoke louder than any words.

These acts did not erase the past, but they allowed nations to move forward with dignity.

The question is not whether Pakistan can afford to apologize. The question is whether it can afford not to.

Reference: 

https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/why-1971-still-casts-shadow-bangladesh-pakistan-relations-3970356

Provinces, Power, and Politics in Pakistan

 Why the Debate on New Provinces Misses the Real Problem

Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, not a single new province has been carved out of the federation. Yet the debate on provincial reorganization refuses to fade. Calls for new provinces resurface every few years, usually tied to grievances of representation, governance, or resource allocation. But beneath the noise lies a fundamental question: would creating more provinces fix Pakistan’s governance crisis—or simply multiply its inefficiencies?

The 19-Provinces Idea

Some reformers argue that Pakistan should be divided into as many as 19 provinces. Such a restructuring would require 19 new high courts, secretariats, and bureaucratic systems—a massive expansion of state machinery. Advocates believe this would bring governance closer to the people. Critics, however, see it as a recipe for ballooning administrative costs without addressing the core issue: the absence of an effective local government system.

Provinces vs. Local Governments

Pakistan’s federal structure was designed so that local governments operate under provincial authority. In practice, however, provincial governments hoard powers meant for municipalities. Instead of handling higher-level functions—such as regional planning, health systems, or education reforms—provincial elites focus on controlling development funds that should be decentralized.

The irony is stark: while politicians argue over creating more provinces, no political party wants to empower local councils. The devolution envisioned in the constitution remains largely cosmetic. Article 140-A, which mandates elected local governments with financial and administrative powers, is honored more in breach than practice.

Unequal Representation and Electoral Fault Lines

Supporters of new provinces often cite regional imbalances. In Sindh, the political divide between rural and urban areas is glaring. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) consistently wins rural Sindh but rarely secures urban constituencies—yet it rules the entire province. Once in power, PPP governments are accused of channeling budgets toward rural constituencies, reinforcing their vote bank while neglecting urban centers like Karachi and Hyderabad.

Punjab tells a similar story. Elections along the GT Road belt decide who governs not just Punjab but often all of Pakistan, given the province’s dominance in the National Assembly. As a result, development priorities are skewed toward central Punjab, leaving southern and western districts marginalized.

Experiments in Devolution

Among recent governments, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) pushed hardest for local governance. Its reform shifted authority to the Tehsil level rather than districts, an attempt to bypass entrenched bureaucratic structures. While innovative, the experiment struggled against entrenched resistance: provincial governments of all parties have historically guarded their monopoly on development work.

The political calculus is simple: no ruling elite is willing to surrender power—whether at the provincial or federal level. As a result, the constitutional promise of local empowerment remains unrealized.

The Cost of More Provinces

The creation of new provinces may appear as a solution to Pakistan’s structural imbalance, but without functioning local governments, it risks becoming an expensive illusion. More secretariats, more bureaucrats, and more courts will not solve the everyday problems of waste collection, water supply, or schools—that requires grassroots governance.

Experts warn that the focus should not be on drawing new borders, but on making Article 140-A a lived reality. Until that happens, Pakistan’s governance woes will persist, no matter how many provinces exist on paper.

The Bottom Line

Pakistan’s governance crisis is less about the number of provinces and more about the distribution of power. Without genuine devolution, new provinces will merely expand the administrative elite, not empower citizens.

The real frontier for reform lies in local governments—not provincial maps.

References:

Bangladesh–Pakistan Relationship Reset

A New Chapter in South Asian Diplomacy?

On Saturday, August 23, 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar landed in Dhaka for a two-day visit, accompanied by Commerce Minister Jamal Kamal Khan, who had arrived two days earlier. The high-level engagements signal more than routine diplomacy: they mark an attempt to reset bilateral ties after decades of estrangement.

During the visit, Dhaka and Islamabad are expected to sign a series of agreements—including visa-free travel for diplomatic and official passport holders, cooperation between their foreign service academies, and the establishment of a joint working group under the two commerce ministries. Renewed memoranda on cultural exchanges and a media cooperation pact between the Bangladesh Press Institute and the Associated Press of Pakistan are also on the agenda.

On Sunday, August 24, a formal signing ceremony will take place before Dar meets Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. The symbolism is clear: these are not isolated gestures but part of a deliberate strategy to anchor relations on a broader political, economic, and cultural foundation.

Breaking from the Past

The timing is significant. Muhammad Yunus’s interim government has championed a foreign policy of “friendship to all”, a sharp departure from the Awami League’s India-centric orientation. Within a year, Dhaka and Islamabad have revived high-level communication, reopened maritime trade routes after five decades, and even explored nascent military cooperation.

Yet history weighs heavily. For Bangladesh, the 1971 Liberation War remains etched into national consciousness, while Pakistan continues to insist that the 1974 Tripartite Agreement with India settled wartime grievances. During Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule, relations with Pakistan were frosty, exacerbated by Dhaka’s war crimes tribunal and executions of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders—trials Islamabad dismissed as politically motivated.

The change of government in 2024, however, shifted the tone almost immediately. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Chief Advisor Yunus met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and D-8 Summit, laying the groundwork for renewed cooperation. Trade surged by 20% in FY 2024–25, direct shipping resumed in November 2024, and Pakistan’s budget airline Fly Jinnah secured Dhaka routes.

Promise and Peril

While the momentum is real, challenges remain formidable. The demand for a formal apology from Pakistan retains powerful symbolic weight in Bangladeshi politics. At the same time, some fear rapprochement may be interpreted as a zero-sum shift away from India, risking domestic polarization.

Economic ties, though growing, remain modest compared to potential. Without targeted agreements and enhanced connectivity, political symbolism could outpace substance. Security cooperation, especially discussions on Chinese-built JF-17 jets, will also be closely watched in New Delhi.

Still, opportunities exist. Reopening direct sea routes can reduce trade costs, while expanding the Joint Business Council to include digital platforms and SMEs could push bilateral trade toward the ambitious $3 billion target. Pakistan’s offer of 300 fully funded scholarships for Bangladeshi students, coupled with expanded cultural exchanges, could gradually erode societal mistrust.

The Regional Angle

India’s shadow inevitably looms large. For New Delhi, Bangladesh has been a strategic anchor, particularly during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. But with Dhaka now diversifying ties, India may respond with non-tariff barriers, import restrictions, and intensified engagement with multiple Bangladeshi stakeholders. Security signaling to deter deep Dhaka–Islamabad defence cooperation cannot be ruled out.

For Bangladesh, the key will be demonstrating that engagement with Pakistan is not an alternative to India, but rather part of a balanced foreign policy in a multipolar South Asia. 

Looking Ahead

Resetting Bangladesh–Pakistan relations requires a mindset shift on both sides. For Dhaka, this means pursuing pragmatic interests without letting history imprison the future. For Islamabad, it requires symbolic gestures and genuine trust-building, whether through joint historical research, parliamentary exchanges, or people-to-people initiatives.

The visits of Ishaq Dar and Jamal Kamal Khan mark more than ceremonial diplomacy—they represent a diplomatic crossroads. Whether this becomes a milestone or a missed opportunity will depend on how both nations manage the interplay of history, politics, and pragmatism.

The past cannot be erased. But if handled carefully, it need not define the future.

References:

https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/bangladesh-pakistan-relations-reassessing-the-past-reimagining-the-future-3969346

Trump Quest to Oust the Top Brass

The purge at the Pentagon is accelerating. On August 22, 2025, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Pentagon Intelligence Chief Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse, weeks after the White House rejected a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) review assessing the aftermath of American airstrikes on Iran. The dismissal is the latest move in a sweeping campaign to remove senior military leaders viewed as disloyal or out of step with the administration’s narrative.

Kruse’s ouster was accompanied by the removal of two other high-ranking officials: Rear Adm. Milton Sands, commander of Navy Special Warfare Command, and Vice Adm. Nancy Lacore, chief of the Navy Reserve. Both will no longer serve in those roles.

A Clash Over Intelligence

The DIA, a Pentagon agency specializing in military intelligence, had concluded in a leaked June report that U.S. strikes on Iran had only set back Tehran’s nuclear program by “months, not years.” The White House dismissed the assessment as “flat-out wrong.”

President Trump declared that the strikes had “completely destroyed” Iran’s nuclear facilities, calling it one of “the most successful military operations in history.” He accused the media of spreading false narratives to undermine his foreign policy victories. Speaking at the NATO Summit, Secretary Hegseth criticized the DIA’s findings as based on “low-quality intelligence” and revealed that the FBI was probing the source of the leak.

A Broader Purge

Kruse’s dismissal fits a broader pattern. Since returning to office, Trump has moved aggressively against military leaders he perceives as obstacles.

• April 2025: Trump fired Gen. Timothy Haugh, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), along with more than a dozen staffers at the National Security Council.

• February 2025: Hegseth dismissed Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Air Force Chief and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brown, a decorated fighter pilot and only the second Black officer to hold the chairman’s post, was ousted alongside five other senior Pentagon officials, including Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the Navy’s first female chief of operations; Gen. Jim Slife, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and top legal advisers for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth dismissed the U.S. military’s top legal advisors, including Judge Advocates General (JAGs) for all three services:

• Army JAG: Lt. Gen. Joseph B. Berger III was removed from his position.
• Air Force JAG: Lt. Gen. Charles L. Plummer was also dismissed.
• Navy JAG: The previous holder, Vice Adm. Christopher French, had retired about two months earlier; Hegseth said he was already seeking a replacement.

Hegseth defended these actions by stating the outgoing JAGs were not “well-suited to provide recommendations when lawful orders are given.” He did not offer any further explanation or justification

Targeting Female Military Leaders

Trump’s purge has been particularly striking in its removal of senior female officers.

• On his first full day in office, Trump fired Adm. Linda Fagan, Commandant of the Coast Guard.

• In February, Hegseth dismissed Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the first woman to lead the Navy.

• Most recently, Vice Adm. Shoshana Chatfield, the only woman on NATO’s military committee, was forced out. A Navy helicopter pilot and Afghanistan veteran, Chatfield had served as one of NATO’s 32 senior military representatives, providing advice to the North Atlantic Council and the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.

Chatfield’s dismissal marks the third senior female officer fired under Trump’s watch, fueling concerns of gender-targeted purges in addition to broader institutional shake-ups.

A Military in Flux

The pattern is unmistakable: Trump is remaking America’s military leadership in his own image, favoring loyalty over dissent and narrative control over independent analysis. By sidelining senior officials—many with decades of service—he is not just reshaping the Pentagon, but also challenging the norms that have traditionally insulated the U.S. military from political intervention.

The result is a Department of Defense in turmoil, NATO allies unsettled, and an officer corps wary of stepping out of line. Whether this strategy strengthens civilian control or erodes the institutional independence of the armed forces may prove to be one of the defining legacies of Trump’s second presidency.

References:

1. https://wtop.com/national/2025/08/jeffrey-kruse-ousted-as-defense-intelligence-agency-director/
   
2. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hegseth-fires-defense-intelligence-agency-chief-other-senior-pentagon-officials
   
3. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2025/08/22/hegseth-fires-head-of-defense-intelligence-agency/